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ABSTRACT
Since the political crisis in 2012, the European Union has stepped up its
commitment to Mali and the Sahel using various external intervention
instruments gathered under the Common Security and Defence Policy
(CSDP). These instruments are designed to achieve functional and
normative goals of the EU. Situating in the debate on normative
actorness of the EU and by applying the Whole-of-Society (WOS)
approach to conﬂict prevention and peacebuilding, this paper investi-
gates how the European Capacity Building mission for the Malian
Security Forces (EUCAP Sahel–Mali) is operationalising two key EU-
SSR-related norms – local ownership and inclusivity– and manoeuvres
context and programme speciﬁc challenges. By analysing the mission-
training/capacity building and outreach, this paper argues the EUCAP
mission has been largely functional than normative driven, thus redu-
cing the EU’s overall reputation as a normative actor, particularly in the
area of security. This paper oﬀers practical recommendations to reach
the EU’s normative goals via SSR.
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Introduction
Situated in the ongoing debates on norms1 in international politics and external
intervention, this paper investigates the EU’s normative actorness,2 in the ﬁelds of
conﬂict prevention and peacebuilding, and in particular, the contribution to
Security Sector Reform (SSR) as a discreet ﬁeld of normative action.3 With the
CONTACT Shyamika Jayasundara-Smits jayasundara@iss.nl International Institute of Social Studies, Erasmus
University Rotterdam, The Hague, The Netherlands
1Norms are deﬁned as ideas of varying degrees of abstraction and speciﬁcation with respect to fundamental values, organising
principles or standardised procedures that resonate across many states and global actors, having gained support in multiple
forums including oﬃcial policies, laws, treaties or agreements. Norms are also understood as standards of behaviour based on
inter-subjective validity. L.Zimmerman, Global Norms with a Local Face: Rule-of-Law Promotion and Norm Translation
(Cambridge: Cambridge University press 2017):7.
2H.Bull,’Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 21, no2 (1982):149–170; I.
Manners, ’Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’. JCMS: Journal of CommonMarket Studies, 40 (2002): 235–258.
3E.Gordon, A.C.Welch and E.Roos, ‘Security Sector Reform and the Paradoxical Tension between Local Ownership and Gender
Equality’. Stability: International Journal of Security and Development, 4, no.1), (2015):53. T. A. Donais, ‘ Inclusion or Exclusion?
Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform’, Studies in Social Justice’, 3, no. 1 (2009): 117–131. A.J.Bellamy, ‘Security Sector
Reform: Prospects and Problems’, Peace, Security & Global Change (formerly Paciﬁca Review) 15, no.2 (2003): 101–119. P.
Jackson, ‘Security Sector Reform and State Building’, Third World Quarterly 32, no.10 (2011): 1803–1822. R.Kunz, ‘Gender and
Security Sector Reform: Gendering Diﬀerently?’, International Peacekeeping 21, no.5(2014): 604–622. M.Sedra, ‘The Hollowing-
Out of the Liberal Peace Project in Afghanistan: The Case of Security Sector Reform’, Central Asian Survey 32, no.3(2013):
371–387.
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return of realpolitik and the realist security dilemma in international politics and
the move by the EU to deﬁne its overall approach to security and foreign aﬀairs
based on ‘principled-pragmatism’,4 the EU has come under increased critical
scrutiny regarding the delivery of its normative commitments.
Despite the commitment to combine principles/norms with pragmatism, scholars
observe that pragmatism is increasingly taking precedence over principles and
norms.5 In the case of SSR, the imbalance between the functional and normative
imperative of EU actions can be partly explained owing to the contextually rooted
challenges met by SSR missions in third countries. However, a more robust inquiry
based on a ﬂexible yet analytically rich framework is needed to capture the other
challenges experienced by the EU, especially the ones that are programme speciﬁc
and the challenges emanating from a process of dynamic interactions between the
context and programme goals.
Whole-of-Society approach (WOS)6
The paper uses the ‘Whole-of-Society’ (WOS) approach to conﬂict prevention and
peacebuilding to propose that the EU could enhance the normative dimension of
its SSR interventions, compared to the principled pragmatism approach, through a
clearer focus on the normative standards such as inclusivity, ownership and
gender equality, which are implied but which appear to have been eclipsed or
relegated in recent examples of SSR missions such as EUCAP Sahel.
The WOS approach is both a prescriptive and a normative ideal. As a prescriptive
approach, ‘WOS’ assumes that peacebuilding and conﬂict prevention will be more
eﬀective when a broad(er) range of actions and intentions are identiﬁed and taken
into account. As a normative approach, WOS emphasises the importance of inclusivity
as a key principle of external interventions. In this sense, the term ‘WOS’ refers to
ambitions which underpinned and motivated the Mali SSR intervention. The paper
seeks to critically assess the range of actors with which the EU engaged and identify
related issues of exclusion and marginalisation as part of the engagement process. By
focusing on presences–absences, inclusions–exclusions and the marginalisation–eleva-
tion of certain actors over the others, we hope to show the opportunities for enhancing
these normative aspects of the EUCAP Sahel–Mali mission, as well as the implications
for not so doing.
In this paper, we refer to ‘inclusivity’ to denote both actors and spaces in a
conﬂict environment. It refers to the degree of access to meaningful participation
and decision-making by a range of actors concerned with/aﬀected by a given
conﬂict, beyond the most powerful elites. These actors can vary from community-
based organisations to ordinary citizens to the potential spoilers, who can exercise
4EU External Action Service (EEAS GSFSP), ‘Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe – A Global Strategy for
the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy’. Brussels (2016)..
5S.Biscop, ’The EU Global Strategy: Realpolitik with European Characteristics’ in Might and Right in World Politics,
International Security: a European – South American Dialogue 2016, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Rio de Janeiro (2016).
6This section of the article is built on M.Martin, V.Bojicic-Dzelilovic, C. van der Borgh and G. Frerks’ WOSCAP theoretical
and Methodological Framework’, London School of Economics and Political Science, Utrecht University (2015).
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meaningful voice and agency in the design and the implementation of SSR.7 We
assume being inclusive will minimise resistance and rejection from the often
marginalised yet vocal/hardliner actors and increase legitimacy and responsibility
of the programme and of its outcomes from a wide range of constituencies with
the ability to exercise voice and protect their interests throughout the reform
process. Overall, by applying the WOS approach to the EUCAP Sahel mission we
hope to show how the EU could identify and address some of the challenges
related to norm operationalising, diﬀusion and internalisation via SSR both at
vertical and horizontal levels. In the WOS framework, vertical axis represents an
actor perspective with a focus on normative and practical/operational challenges
to improve inclusivity and engage a wide range of actors in peacebuilding inter-
ventions. The horizontal axis comprises multiple actions located in diﬀerent ﬁelds
of practice and policy.8 By doing so, we hope to highlight some problem-solving
possibilities within the mission and oﬀer suggestions how a WOS approach could
assist the EU to adapt and reform SSR practices in the future.
In the following section, we present the normative trajectory of the EU-SSR,
then the key objectives of the EUCAP Sahel–Mali mission, highlighting the func-
tional and the normative agendas underpinning them. Next, the paper analyses
how key SSR norms- local ownership and inclusivity (including gender) have been
operationalised in the EUCAP Sahel mission and the challenges in doing so. In the
concluding section, the paper oﬀers practical suggestions on what the EU could do
to overcome some of the challenges identiﬁed for norm realisation, through
applying a WOS perspective.
The normative trajectory of the EU-SSR
SSR is an indispensable element of the EU’s combined approach to state building,
conﬂict prevention and peacebuilding. Drawing from the OECD deﬁnition9 the EU
deﬁnes SSR as
the process of transforming a country’s security system, so that it gradually
provides individuals and the state with more eﬀective and accountable security in
a manner consistent with respect for human rights, democracy, the rule of law and
the principles of good governance. SSR is a long-term and political process, as it
goes to the heart of power relations in a country. It needs to be nationally driven
and requires political commitment and leadership, inter-institutional cooperation
and broad stakeholder participation to achieve the widest possible consensus.
Although a clear deﬁnition of SSR is a relatively recent development in EU
policy, since the early 1990s, the EU has undertaken many SSR-related activities.10
The present form and the content of EU-SSR is the outcome of a complex
7T.Donais and E.McCandless,’ International Peace Building and the Emerging Inclusivity Norm’, Third World Quarterly, 38,
no.2 (2017):293.
8Refer to the introductory article of this volume for an elaborate discussion of these two axes.
9OECD. The OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: supporting security and justice OECD, Paris, at: www.
oecd.org/dataoecd/43/25/38406485.pdf. (2007):5.
10F. Longo, ‘Externalization of the Internal Security Strategy in the Framework of Multilateralism: The Case of Security
Sector Reform’, in New Challenges for the EU Internal Security Strategy, eds. Maria O’Neill, Ken Swinton, Aaron Winter
(Cambridge Scholars Publishing, (2013):244.
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interplay between various norms, ideas, interests and the contestation and nego-
tiation between knowledge and power among the above mentioned three epistemic
communities.11 Since the Feira Council meeting (2000) that established SSR as an
important goal of the EU’s external policy, SSR is being regularly featured as one
of EU’s ﬂagship programme. In the backdrop of changing geo-strategic relations
and the looming ‘conventional security dilemma’,12 today SSR has even become a
strategic priority.13 Furthermore, SSR can be regarded as a testing ground and a
measure of EU’s normative actorness. However, both the normative and functional
achievements of the EU-SSR are not without criticisms. One main and recurrent
criticism is SSR being the linchpin of EU’s liberal state building and peacebuilding
project.14 For the EU, SSR is very much a technical as well as a political process.
While the technical underscores the functional imperative, the political under-
scores the normative .15 Thus, via SSR, the EU strives to assist third countries to
be eﬀective in their security provisioning by balancing the state’s monopoly of
violence and monopoly of legitimacy.16 Monopoly of legitimacy is primarily
sought by applying a plethora of liberal normative principles: human rights,
democracy, and rule of law, good governance, local ownership, human security,
inclusivity and gender equality.
Since its origins, the EU has been perceived as a norm entrepreneur/inventor
and diﬀuser,17 due to its explicit normative commitments. 18 The EU’s normative
actorness hinges on its ability to eﬀectively and sustainably diﬀuse as well as help
internalise EU’s norms through interventions in a third country, and in this
respect the EU has struggled sometimes due to zero-adoption, selective adoption
and resistance it has encountered. Moreover the EU’s track record of
11G. Faleg, ‘Between Knowledge and Power: Epistemic Communities and the Emergence of Security Sector Reform in the EU
Security Architecture’, European Security, 21, no2, (2012):167. Epistemic community as a network of professionals from a
variety of disciplines and backgrounds, who share a common set of normative and principled beliefs which guide their social
actions, having a shared causal beliefs based on their analysis of practices and a shared notions of validity characterised by
intersubjective, internally deﬁned criteria for weighing and validating knowledge and a common policy enterprise. P.M.Haas,
Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination’, International Organization, Knowledge, Power,
and International Policy Coordination, 46, no. 1 (19,920):3.
12Refers to a situation in which actions taken by a state to increase its own security (usually by military means) cause reactions
from other states, which in turn lead to a decrease rather than an increase in the original state’s security in J.Herz, Political
Realism and Political Idealism: A Study in Theories and Realities, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1951).
13The EU Global Strategy – Year 1 at: https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/vision-action.
14T. A. Donais, ‘Empowerment or Imposition? Dilemmas of Local Ownership in Post-Conﬂict Peacebuilding Processes’,
Peace & Change, 34, no. 1 (2009):6.
15Here, the functional imperative refers to the ability to deploy force against external threats, eﬃciently and eﬀectively.
In other words ‘get the job done’. The normative imperative which is also understood as societal imperative. This is
equivalent to soft power. In the case of EU-SSR, this is derived from the European Liberal values and institutions. In
previous research the scholars have explored the tension between these two imperatives, where optimising
functional imperative is aﬀected by normative imperative. S.Jayasundara-Smits, ‘Civil-Military Synergy at
Operational Level in EU External Action’, Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conﬂict (GPPAC), The
Hague (2016):8.
16S.Jayasundara-Smits and L.Schirch, ‘EU and Security Sector Reform: Tilting at Windmills?’ WOSCAP-EU, Global
Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conﬂict (GPPAC), The Hague (2015):3.
17See L.Zimmermann, ‘Same, Same or Diﬀerent? Norm Diﬀusion Between Resistance, Compliance, and Localization in
Post-conﬂict States’, International Studies Perspectives, 1–19 (2014):100.
This distinction of stages is derived from the ‘norm life-cycle’ model of Finnemore and Sikkink 1998. In the norm
diﬀusion literature, speciﬁc local context in which a norms are promoted and the diﬀerent outcomes of norm
diﬀusion: resistance, full adoption, or a decoupling of rules and practices is captured.
18K.Vadura,’The EU as ‘Norm Entrepreneur’ in the Asian Region: Exploring the Digital Diplomacy Aspect of the Human
Rights Toolbox’, Asia Europe Journal, 13, no.3, (2015):349–360.
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implementing and realising these norms in a third country via SSR is rather
poor.19 As conventional wisdom of SSR research points out, deviating from a
genuine bottom–up community centric approach (over the state centric approach)
is one example of this. Deviating from the bottom–up approach means inviting
room for rejection, disrespect, co-optation and marginalisation or even manipula-
tion of the security needs of the (marginalised) communities by the powerful local
actors. Instead, norm hybridisation is a notable outcome of SSR assistance.20
Signiﬁcant diﬀerences in norm trajectories between the EU and third countries,
suspicion and a lack of local – elite buy-in to EU norms are some of the variables
that could (partially) explain norm hybridisation.21 Norm hybridisation raises
doubts about the EU’s ability to implement new norms via SSR reforms in
diﬀerent cultural contexts, and within a usual short two to three year programme
cycle.22 Moreover, the recent approach of ‘principled-pragmatism’, has raised a
new critique that the EU is back-peddling on its normative commitments, privile-
ging its own security, neighbourhood and hard power, over democratisation.23
Against this background, this paper questions the EU’s normative actorness via
SSR programmes, and in particular, how key EU norms such as inclusivity, local
ownership and gender equality are operationalised via SSR in Mali through the
EUCAP Sahel–Mali mission. The paper analyses two stages of the EUCAP Sahel
mission- planning and implementation, and two key activities of the mission –
training/capacity building and outreach.
The EU’s case for SSR in Mali
Mali is one of the largest countries in Africa, located in the south of the Sahara. It
has a population of 17,994,837 inhabitants, of which 49.97% are women.24 In
addition, a large proportion of persons (66.2%) are under the age of 25 years.
Economically, it is one of the poorest countries in the world. Mali takes the 179th
place in the Human Development Index (2015) despite being the ‘donor darling’
in Africa.25 The complex and ever deepening security crisis experienced by Mali
since 2012 is a manifestation of combination of economic, political and other
governance deﬁcits. The deteriorating security conditions are alluded to ongoing
contestations between various armed groups for power and territorial control and
the state’s struggles against the increase in non-state armed groups. Various
alliances formed between local Jihadist groups and Al-Qaeda, and organisations
supported by Arab countries are blamed for Mali’s worsening security crisis. At
the beginning, the security crisis was largely limited to the remote areas where the
19S.Panebianco, ‘The constraints to EU action as a ‘norm entrepreneur’ in the Mediterranean, paper presented at the
ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops themed New Roles for the European Union in International Politics (2004).
20U.C.Schroeder, F Chappuis and D.Kocak,’Security Sector Reform and the Emergence of Hybrid Security Governance’,
International Peacekeeping, 21, no.2 (2014):217.
21U.C.Schroeder and F.Chappuis ‘New Perspectives on Security Sector Reform: The Role of Local Agency and Domestic
Politics’, International Peacekeeping, 21 (2): 133,148 (2014):137.
22Jayasundara-Smits (2015).
23Biscop (2016):92.
24World Bank 2016 ﬁgures at: https://data.worldbank.org/country/mali.
25I.Bergamaschi ‘The Fall of a Donor Darling: The Role of Aid in Mali’s Crisis’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 52, no.3
(2014):347–378.
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state was starkly absent. Today, it is rapidly spreading to the capital and other
urban areas. Initially, with the help of the French military action (Operation
Serval26), the Malian state was able to recapture some of the territories lost in
the North (Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal) from the armed rebel groups (i.e. Malian
Islamic movement– Ançar Dine). Nevertheless, to date, the overall security situa-
tion remains critical.27 These worsening security conditions demand major
reforms to the Malian state’s security apparatus as well as ﬁnding eﬀective govern-
ance arrangements to address the underlying complex and multiple causes of the
multiple crises hit by Mali.
EUCAP Sahel–Mali mission: scope and functions
The EU has long been a key development donor to Mali.28 However, under the
heightened security crisis (since 2012), the EU began to increase assistance via the
Comprehensive Regional Approach (2013) and Action Plan (2015) for the Sahel region
by interlinking security, development and governance.29
In 2015, the EU established EUCAP Sahel–Mali as a civilian support mission, in
addition to the European Union Training Mission (EUTM) that had been opera-
tional since February 2013. The main mandate of the EUCAP Sahel mission was to
provide strategic advice and training to the three Malian internal security forces, i.e.
the police, the Gendarmerie and the National Guard and to the relevant
ministries,30 with the perspective of ‘modernising’ the Malian security sector. The
EUCAP advisors are assigned to help their Malian counterparts to improve their
national strategy for human resources, to modernise management practices and
control of their services, and with the successfully recruitment of new staﬀ within
the Police, the Gendarmerie and the National Guard. As one could note, these
activities are concerns with technical capacity building in the security sector.
Mission’s other related activities such as developing a human resources database,
an employment policy and staﬀ management database, a baseline for staﬃng, a
skills-based staﬀ recruitment policy, operational management methods to help
restore hierarchical links, audit and inspection units within the general forces
inspectorate, are targeting nothing other than bureaucratic uniformity and the
functional imperative. Worryingly, the second phase of the mission (extended till
2019) shows increased focus on functional imperative and sliding away from the
normative commitments. The newly introduced activities of strengthening the inter-
nal security forces’ capacity to ﬁght against terrorism and organised crime and
26This mission was undertaken by France in January 2013 following the United Nations Security Council Resolution
2085 in December 2012 and an oﬃcial request from the Malian interim government for French assistance (United
Nations Security Council, ‘Security Council Press Statement on Mali’ (2013).
27UN Security Council Press Statement 6 October 2017, https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc13019.doc.htm.
28J.Carlsson, G.Somolekae and N. Van de Walle. Foreign Aid in Africa: Learning from Country Experiences, Nordiska
Africinstutet, Uppsala (1997):145.
29Rapid launch of three SSR speciﬁc missions – EUTM, EUCAP Niger Sahel and EUCAP Sahel mission is seen as part of
the EU’s instrumental response to the Malian security crisis, which is intertwined with the EU’s own security dilemma
and the need for combatting combined eﬀects of the humanitarian catastrophe, security challenges and the risk of
large numbers of refugees coming to the EU. R.Gowan, ‘Bordering On Crisis: Europe, Africa, and A New Approach to
Crisis Management’, Brief Policy, European Council on Foreign Relations (2017).
30EEAS (June 2016).
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supporting Mali in managing migration ﬂows and border management31 provide
evidence to this eﬀect. These two speciﬁc activities are built on the logic of
‘securitisation’ thus enabling to by-pass the established norms and the rules.32
However, given the EU’s overall approach to SSR, still one could assume all these
activities to be undertaken, respecting the EU’s normative principles underlying
SSR. Yet, given the EU’s recent eagerness to pursue a principled-pragmatic approach
to crisis intervention as announced in its Global Strategy on Foreign and Security
Policy (2016), pragmatism taking a precedence over the ‘principled’ is forewarned
too.33
As illustrated above, the overall mission is increasingly lacking in the balance
between the functional and the normative imperative. This seems to be the case
especially in the background of worsening security conditions in the Sahel region
emanating from terrorism and increased irregular migration to Europe (least,
according to the EU’s interpretation). Given the complexity, enormity and perva-
siveness of these challenges which the EU mission continued to grapple with, to an
extent, one could understand the EU’s inclination towards pragmatism. However,
the long-term eﬀects of EU’s current approach in realising its normative commit-
ments are a valid concern. Therefore, it is pertinent to ﬁnd out what the EU does/
could do to operationalise SSR speciﬁc norms – inclusivity and local ownership in
mission planning, implementation and evaluation and through its’ everyday activ-
ities. In the following section, we analyse to what extent the mission planning was
undertaken respecting these two norms, the challenges faced in doing so and the
long and short term eﬀects of (non) realisation.
Mission planning: inclusions–exclusions and implications for norm (non)
realisation
The planning process of the EUCAP mission was undertaken respecting the
principle of inclusivity.34 The overall goals and the content of the mission was
decided in-line with the National Strategies (Plan pour la reliance durable du
Mali-PRED2013-2014) presented by the Malian state authorities.35 The EU’s plan-
ning process was aimed at maximising the local engagement and ownership of the
reform process, as well as eventually holding the Malian counterparts responsible
for the mission’s outcomes. However, there are a number of issues identiﬁed in
relation to the degree of ownership and inclusivity of the EU’s approach during
mission planning. The exclusion of some local actors meant the planning process
31EU Oﬃcial website of the mission https://eucap-sahel-mali.eu/.
32B.Buzan, O.Waever and J.De Wilde.Security, A New Framework for Analysis (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc.
(1998):23.
33Use of EU’s new Partnership Framework with Third Countries (EC 2016) is an alarming development where
pragmatism is looming larger over the normative in EU policy and practice. This framework is currently used to
strike 1–1 deals with a number of rough regimes such as Ethiopia, Turkey, Sudan and Libya to address the EU
migration crisis. Although EU has been able signiﬁcantly reduce the number of migrants arriving at their borders, the
deal has come under heavy criticism for sacriﬁcing the international norms and principles in achieving these results.
34DCAF and FBF, Country Case Studies to Inform the EU-wide Strategic Framework for Supporting SSR: Findings from
Mali, DRC AND Ukraine, Final Report. Geneva, (March 2016):21.
35M.Djiré, D.Sow, K.Gakou and B.Camara, Assessing the EU’s conﬂict prevention and
peacebuilding interventions in Mali. Bamako: Université des Sciences Juridiques et Politiques de Bamako (2016):7.
PEACEBUILDING 239
fell short on its aim of inclusivity. Although the planning documents mention
involving civil society in planning, its role is limited to a supporting and a
contributory actor to the mission, and it was excluded in terms of subjectivities –
ideas, norms and visions. Furthermore, the non-involvement of actors from the
Northern part of the country during the consultation process36 is notable. Such
exclusions can be counterproductive inasmuch as they create the risk of competing
and overlapping types of security governance arrangements at local level, which
are based on diﬀerent religious and family structures.37 Although largely informal,
these security arrangements are found to be eﬀective. The role they play in
providing security in the remote areas-where the state is absent appear vital.38
Exclusion of these actors and the favouring of a top–down model based on EU
standards marginalise and reject the local episteme of security and make local
communities passive recipients or subordinates of the external model.
Furthermore, the process followed by the EU-represented marginalisation of the
northern population, already a source of grievance among people in this part of
the country. One fear is that this could contribute to escalate the current security
crisis as the marginalised northern actors resort to violence to express and draw
attention to their grievances. It also increases the risk that following a traditional
‘train and equip’ approach could stimulate the competition for power and hege-
mony between diﬀerent elite groups as they attempt to capture the new security
institutions.
The EU also compromised its own norms by co-opting, by pushing its own
security agenda above local demands and needs. Furthermore, it was claimed that
the EU pressured local elites to comply with its own priorities.39 The new mission
goals of strengthening of the internal security forces’ capacity in the ﬁght against
terrorism and organised crime, support for managing migration ﬂows and border
management40 not only reﬂected a privileging of the EU’s security interests, which
is at odds with the norm of local ownership. The EU was also criticised for
concluding ‘deals’ with the local elites,41 which resulted in strengthening the
repressive powers of the local elites and exacerbating governance deﬁcits. Thus,
new security arrangements that emerge through such a bargaining process run the
risk of establishing ‘ceremonial’ security institutions which lack any value proposi-
tion imbued in them.42
36Nevertheless the Algeria brokered a peace deal ‘Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, resulting from the
Algiers Process” (also known as the ‘Bamako Agreement’) signed in 2015 included an alliance of Tuareg-led rebels
and the Malian State representatives. The implementation of the peace process is far behind schedule and its
achievements so far are very little A.Boutellis and Marie-Joëlle Zahar, ‘ Process in Search of Peace: Lessons from the
Inter-Malian Agreement,’ New York: International Peace Institute (2017):2.
37J. Aulin and C.Divin, ‘Towards Local Ownership of International Interventions in Mali’, Policy Note, Issue 1, Global
Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conﬂict, The Hague (2017).
38Aulin and Divin (2017).
39ibid.
40EC, PRESS RELEASE 8/17 11/01/2017 EUCAP Sahel Mali: mission extended for two years, €29.7 million budget
adopted.
41M.Barnett and C.Zürcher, ‘The Peacebuilders Contract: How External State-building Reinforces Weak Statehood’, in
The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Post-war Peace Operations, eds. R. Paris and T. Sisk
(2009): 13–52.
42Ibid:39.
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Mission execution: training and capacity building
The next section looks at how inclusivity was encouraged and/or prevented by the
mission as part of its training and capacity building activities.
Training and capacity development are the main objectives of the EUCAP Sahel
mission. In order to reach these goals, the mission uses a training and capacity
building curriculum. As the mission website43 states, the EUCAP Sahel training and
capacity building activities are developed ‘jointly with the United Nations
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the
EUTM Mali military training mission in order to optimise support for the Malian
state’. This approach raises many issues. First, it implies limitations in a training
curriculum intended for civilian purposes, conducted by a military mission. Second,
such an approach prioritises the superiority of military’s knowledge and values over
that of the civilian. On one hand, this approach may help to socialise the Malian
security forces in terms of the international system, doctrines and the international
norms. At the same time, it could distance them from local communities, their
realities and assessments of security threats at everyday level. The latter is already
reﬂected in the content of the training provided. The EUCAP training curriculum
covers a large number of technical subjects, such as management and command,
professional ethics, intelligence techniques, professional intervention, criminal poli-
cing, counter-terrorism and public order.44 The training curriculum gives little
attention to norm-related topics. At present, they are limited to training on the
topics ‘Human Rights and Gender.’45
The EUCAP training programmes target the staﬀ at senior and the intermediate levels.
Each selected staﬀ member receives 100 h of individual training on all topics, over a
period of 4 weeks. So far, about 1600 security personals have undergone the programme.
The training programme also has a training of trainers (TOT) component. The goal of
TOT is to promote local ownership of the training programme. With the support of the
EU training advisers, the participants are selected by the commanders of the Malian three
internal civilian forces. Due to the culture of ‘following orders’ in the armed forces,
undergoing the EUCAP training programme appears obligatory than voluntary. The
obligatory character of the training thus raises issues of varying degrees of interest and
commitment to diﬀerent subject matters by the participants. Without giving a chance to
voluntarily enlist, there is no way of knowing participants’ underlying motivations for
taking part in the training programme. It may well be the case that the seriously
impoverished Malian soldiers, ﬁnding the components of weapons and technical training
more attractive over the normative part. Previous incidents of mass dissertation by several
US-trained battalions (including the 2012 coup leader Captain Amadou Sanogo) upon
completing a US-led anti-terror training programme, the trained soldiers eventually
joining the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and committing
mass atrocities against the Tuaregs and Arabs illustrate negative examples of the related
43EUCAP oﬃcial website https://eucap-sahel-mali.eu/.
44EUCAP oﬃcial website https://eucap-sahel-mali.eu/.
45In terms of oﬀering training on gender and Human rights, Mali paints a crowded scenario, where many international,
regional and civil society organisations are conducting such training courses for the Malian security forces, and the
civil society organisations (i.e. MINUSMA, UN Women and UNFPA, Beyond Peace) .
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motivational dimension.46 Recalling this particular incident, Prof. Goita shared, ‘As far as
I’m aware, more than 80 Malian soldiers deserted after the training course, taking their
weapons and baggage with them’.47
The criteria applied for selecting participants also point to a compromise of the
normative principles of local ownership and inclusivity. As the mission documents
reveal, themed-level and higher oﬃcials are the main target groups of the trainings.
From the point of view of the EU and of the Malian authorities, there are justiﬁable
reasons for this choice. For instance, targeting higher level oﬃcials is important for buy-
in to the programme, to counter internal resistance and create conditions for local
ownership and responsibility.48 Excluding higher oﬃcials creates mal-functioning
security sector institutions, and instances of ‘loose coupling’ between what is formal
and what is the actual day-to-day practice.49 Having a more inclusive enrolment
strategy that targets the security actors at the bottom of the hierarchy is important,
while excluding front line cadres who interact with local communities is a missed
opportunity to learn from their everyday experiences in understanding and addressing
local security needs. In this way, the mission lost an opportunity to integrate their
experience and (tacit) inputs for designing the training programme and making it
‘relevant’ in addressing complex real life security challenges.50 As Gordon argued,
including the security actors from the bottom of the hierarchy is useful for building
genuine local ownership, addressing local needs and increasing trust, conﬁdence and
legitimacy of security institutions.51
As mentioned before, there was an imbalance between the technical and normative
parts of the EUCAP training curriculum. Ninety-ﬁve per cent of the overall curriculum
consists of technical subjects. Only two topics (Human Rights and Gender) cover
normative aspects. Therefore, for the Malian soldiers who take part in the training
programme, the marginal attention given to the norm-related subjects in the curricu-
lum may mean superiority of technical over the normative. It could also mean EU
losing out of an important opportunity in achieving its combined functional-normative
values of preparing well-trained soldiers who also ﬁght respecting human rights,
avoiding unlawful practices, not engaging in torture and rape. Also, the content of
the two norm-related topics deals with the legal backgrounds of these subjects
(International Humanitarian Law and United Nations Frameworks for Gender
Equality).52 In addition, even the trainers who delivered the normative parts of the
46P.Hatcher, ‘French general urges EU to equip “impoverished” Mali army’, Reuters (20February 2013).
47K.Gänsler, EU military training in Mali (2013), at: http://p.dw.com/p/17Qrr .
48Jayasundara-Smits and L.Schirch (2015):18.
49Schroeder and Kocak:217.
50Author’s previous personal experiences in conducting Human Rights training programmes (2005–2007) for Sri Lanka’s
military and the police by separating the higher oﬃcers from the soldiers indicates several gaps. On one hand,
separate training was an eﬀective strategy to foster an environment for full participation of the each group of
participants without prejudice and by overcoming the ‘hierarchy’ in these establishments. On the other hand, it was
also a lost opportunity in fostering collaborative partnerships between diﬀerent rungs and in developing empathy to
each other’s roles and tasks.
51Schroeder and Chappuis, ‘New Perspectives on Security Sector Reform:’, 1.
52This shows similarity with the reﬂections from the ISSAT, the main training provider for the EUTAM training mission
on International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights. As the project reﬂection paper notes, the design and the
delivery of the military training curriculum taking priority over the Human rights trainings and the ratio of military
versus Human rights trainers was 185:1 (http://issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/SSR-in-Practice/Countries-Regions/Mali?view=
resources).
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curriculum expressed their deep dissatisfaction with the overbearing nature of the
combat and intelligence-related subjects in the curriculum. They are also not satisﬁed
with the format of the training delivery that compartmentalises the normative and the
technical subjects.53 The strict separation between the technical and normative subjects
is also problematic as it misses the simultaneous interactive dynamics between the
norms and the functions. Against the general passive learning culture in Mali, achieving
the normative goals with this particular format is challenging. As one EU trainer
(technical) who conducted a practical training session on police forensic investigation
exercise commented, despite their enthusiasm to learn, the Malian participants are
spectators than active participants.54
With regard to inclusivity, as a whole, the EUCAP training and its related technical
and normative components were mainly delivered by the EU member states and their
northern civil society counterparts. For instance, Human Rights training was mostly
delivered by a French civil society organisation ‘Beyond Peace’.55 According to the
recent documents, the HR training is also delivered in partnership with EUTM,
MINUSMA and international human rights organisations: ICRC and UN Women.56
The choice of northern civil society organisations in delivering the normative parts of
the curriculum is noteworthy here. At the outset, the heavy involvement of the northern
CSOs signals out a cultural connotation. As Lederach reminds us, training is one key
element of capacity building and it is about selling ‘social’ knowledge.57 ‘Selling social
knowledge’ requires concientisation– awareness of self in context and promoting both
personal and social transformation in the participants.58 Therefore, when crossing
cultural boundaries in training, it is crucial to deploy trainers from a mixture of cultural
backgrounds.59 Solely assigning the northern organisations to deliver, especially the
normative content of the training (or in other words ‘selling cultural knowledge’) not
only excludes local actors, it also means exclusion of diﬀerent knowledge traditions and
epistemes. By side-lining the local actors– hence local norms and cultures and prac-
tices – the mission’s training activities seemed to have missed out on an important
opportunity for dialogue and (re) negotiation or co-invention of new norms that are
acceptable, meaningful and implementable in the local context.
Outreach activities: the matter of gender
In this section, we analyse outreach as one of the key activities undertaken by the
EUCAP Sahel–Mali mission. Outreach activities provide an important public space
for the EU to demonstrate its commitment and consistent application of its own
norms in everyday activities of the mission, thus demonstrating its normative
actorness. Outreach activities of the mission are used here to illustrate how and
to what extend the EU’s normative actorness is achieved/compromised through
practice of gender equality – a norm that is being repeatedly aﬃrmed in EU policy
53ibid.
54European Gendarmerie Force, ‘A look inside EUCAP Sahel Mali’ at: http://www.eurogendfor.org.
55ISSAT .
56DCAF and FBF (2016):24.
57J.P.Lederach, Preparing for Peace: Conﬂict Transformation Across Cultures, Syracuse University press. (1996):6.
58Lederach (1996):19.
59Lederach (1996):23.
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documents.60 Gender equality is integral to local ownership and inclusivity,
because it cuts across all the norms underpinning SSR (human rights, good
governance, and democracy) and sits in every intersection of all social relation-
ships, relations of power.61 Gender equality is an important normative criterion of
measuring the success of SSR programmes. It is not because men and women
experience security diﬀerently, but also because the security institutions must be
representative and equally responsive to the needs of both men and women and
owned by both men and women.62
However, gender equality is not an easily transferable norm across cultures.63 In order to
realise gender equality, the EUCAP mission needed to think ‘outside the box’. Outreach
provides an opportunity for tapping into neglected or seemingly invisible ‘everyday spaces’
to communicate/practice norms regularly. It can be an important and subtle means for
debating, assessing, reﬂecting and renegotiating norms in the local context.
Using the mission’s publicly available outreach documents64 (which focuses on training
and capacity building) and by applying the WOS perspective with a focus on the inclusions
and exclusions, presences and absences dimensions,65 this section throws light on how gender
equality is being practiced by the mission. A cursory look at the mission’s outreach materials
suggests however that it lacks sensitivity towards gender equality as a key normative principle.
Instead, these documents indicate a reinforcement of gender inequality within themission, in
the capacity building programme and in Malian society. Over representation of men,
compared to women in mission’s public documents is one of the key issues identiﬁed. For
instance, at least 90% of the images used in the mission’s periodical newsletter – ‘La Gazelle’66
(Journal d’information de la Mission EUCAP Sahel–Mali), the foreign male mission staﬀ and
their localmale counterparts aremade hyper visible. These images feed into the existing social
stereotypes of ‘dominant men’. Furthermore, their presences in the outreach materials are
established using images taken mostly during weapons training sessions. Yet again, these
images reinforce another social stereotype of ‘violent men’. These images do not remain as
‘just images’, but are being continually mediated by the local cultural and political contexts
and by existing relations of power in the Malian society, and hence they have serious
normative implications on the Malian society. Furthermore, the absence of women in the
outreach materials also reproduces the established stereotypes of women as innocent,
vulnerable, marginalised, passive and subjects (victims) of man’s violence. By so doing,
these materials contribute in making the agency of Malian women invisible. Malian women’s
60M.Villellas, Pamela Urrutia, Ana Villellas, Vicenç Fisas, Gender in EU Conﬂict Prevention and Peacebuilding Policy and
Practice, Escola de Cultura de Pau,Barcelona (2016):15. This is also endorsed by the landmark UN Security Council
Resolution 2151 on SSR.
61Gordon, Welch & Roos, ‘Security Sector Reform and the Paradoxical Tension’, 4.
62L.Schirch (with Mancini-Griﬀoli, Deborah), Local Ownership in Security: Case Studies of Peacebuilding Approaches. The
Hague: Alliance for Peacebuilding, GPPAC, Kroc Institute (2015):8.
63This is also the case with other norms underpinning SSR such as democracy, good governance, human rights.
64Mission website contains other documents such as factsheets, guidelines with dealing with victims of violence against
women and girls and the handbooks on Criminal Code, on Border Management and on Violence against women and
girls.
65Visual analysis of the newsletter was conducted using media and visual analysis tools of Framing and Focalisation.
See C.B.Schwalbe, ‘Remembering our Shared Past: Visually Framing the Iraq
War on US News Websites’, Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 12, no.1 (2006):264–289; M. Meijer,
‘Countering textual violence: On the critique of representation and the importance of teaching its methods’, Women’s
studies international forum, Elsevier (1993):367–378.
66There are four newsletters issues so far, Issue no.1 (14 January 2016), no:2 (May 2016), and no.3 (January 2017) and
no.4 (May 2017).
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presence in the outreach material is more prominent on topics related to civil society, human
rights and gender-related activities. These images thus reproduce new societal stereotypes of
women (particularly in places Western interventions are taking place), as accomplices of the
west’s intrusive liberal peace project. Regular presences of white-western women as ‘training
providers’ in these materials also recast what Paris cited as ‘mission civilisatrice’.67 Portraying
white-western women in superior positions recast black-local men (and women) as power-
less, uneducated, immature and passive subjects. These numerous visibilities and invisibilities
enacted through the images in the mission’s outreach materials recast the societal race–
gender power relations as well.68 Taken together, these numerous presences and absences and
particular instances of presences and absences compromise the principles of inclusiveness,
local ownership and gender norms.
Conclusion
Applying the WOS approach, this paper has shown how two key SSR norms of
local ownership and inclusivity (inclusive of gender equality) presented operational
challenges for the EUCAP Sahel–Mali mission. These challenges were identiﬁed at
two levels: ﬁrst at the level of overall Malian context (broad) and second at the
mission’s operational level (speciﬁc). Realising and internalising norms was found
to be more diﬃcult against the background of a worsening security crisis in Mali
and in the Sahel region which contributed to distracting the EU and their local
partners from the normative goals of SSR. This situation is further encouraged by
the EU’s ‘principled-pragmatic’ approach to crisis intervention, reﬂected in the
activities of the mission’s second mandate.
From the perspective of WOS, viewing the mission through the prism of the
vertical (inclusiveness of actors) and the horizontal axes (practices) this paper
captured the overtly functional- instrumental nature of the EUCAP Sahel–Mali
mission. The mission’s main objective – training a third of the staﬀ of the internal
security forces in over four weeks, underlines the mission’s preference for applying
a short term, top–down functional approach rather than a longer term normative –
governance–development approach. This was further demonstrated in the activities
of the second phase of the mission that largely focus on counter-terrorism and
border management. These activities show how the mission prioritises EU security
interests over local security considerations, suggesting both a lack of inclusivity
and local ownership and exclusion and marginalisation of local actors during the
planning processes (and even co-optation and manipulation of some of the key
actors) who have important stakes in the Malian security scenario.
By delving into the mission’s training activities and modalities of their delivery, this paper
traced various instances of inclusions, exclusions and marginalisations of actors and the
norms. The imbalance (between normative and functional subjects) in the training curricu-
lum and the mission’s inability to itself demonstrate its own norms of inclusivity and gender
equality when it came to building training teams and the selection of participants was
67R.Paris, ‘International Peacebuilding and the “Mission Civilisatrice’’’,. Review of International Studies, 28, no.4
(2002):638.
68This ﬁnding also echoes Spivak’s observations on how the ‘white’ Western wo/man gender expert takes the role of
saving ‘brown/local’ wo/men victims (Op Cit., in Kunz (2014):610.
PEACEBUILDING 245
signiﬁcant. Although improved gender sensitivity is suggested by normative considerations,
including more women in missions and utilising their agency has also been seen to increase
the functional eﬀectiveness in other cases of SSRmissions. These examples show howwomen
can help gain trust and acceptancemore easily from the local communities and act as eﬀective
carrier of normative messages.69
The analysis of the mission’s public outreach documents suggests how the mission
could be an eﬀective vehicle for norm diﬀusion by focusing on how information is
shared rather than the kind of information provided. A WOS approach suggests that
the mission could have pursued a more inclusive approach by considering segments
such as the Northern populations, and women in the training and outreach activities. In
addition, by reviewing their training and outreach activities against local practices and
by aligning more closely with best practices on gender at international level, and by
integrating national plans and priorities on issues such as inclusivity, use of the
horizontal WOS axis could have improved the mission’s normative focus.
Overall, these ﬁndings suggest the need to acknowledge and engage more deeply with the
normative implications and the underlying political dimension and context of the mission. A
deeper level of political engagement is crucial if the mission is to make an impact on Malian
society and its social–political institutions. By delving deeper into the mission speciﬁc
activities (planning and implementation-training and outreach) this paper was also able to
identify a number of issues in operationalising and realising the EU’s own norms, which in
turn challenge the EU’s overall credibility as a normative actor. However the mission speciﬁc
challenges are easier to address by adjusting everyday activities, and here, aWOS perspective,
would highlight opportunities to counter the incidence of exclusions, invisibilities and
marginalisation in terms of actors and norms. A WOS approach could strengthen the
rhetorical commitments and restore the EU’s diminishing reputation as a normative actor.
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